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ABSTRACT
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 introduced a refundable tax credit for
low-income working families who purchased health insurance coverage for their
children. This health insurance tax credit (HITC) existed during tax years 1991, 1992,
and 1993, and was then rescinded. We use Current Population Survey data and a
difference-in-differences approach to estimate the HITC’s effect on private health
insurance coverage of low-earning single mothers. The findings suggest that during
1991–1993, the health insurance coverage of single mothers was about 6 percentage
points higher than it would have been in the absence of the HITC.
JEL Classification Codes: H2, H51, I18, J32
Keywords: Health insurance, Low-wage workers, Tax credits and subsidies, Earned
Income Tax Credit

Merve Cebi
Department of Economics
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth
285 Old Westport Road
North Dartmouth, MA 02747-2300
email: mcebi@umassd.edu
and
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007
phone: 269-343-5541
fax: 269-343-3308

Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University
Department of Economics
110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
phone: 517-355-4587
fax: 517-432-1068
email: woodbur2@msu.edu
and
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007
phone: 269-343-5541
fax: 269-343-3308

1. Introduction
A longstanding proposal for increasing the health insurance coverage of lowearning workers is to subsidize their coverage through a refundable tax credit (Pauly
1999; Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler 2005; Antos and Miller 2010). Such a Health
Insurance Tax Credit (HITC) would grant a tax credit up to a specified maximum—for
example, $2,000 for an individual and $5,000 for a family—on a tax return where the
filer purchased a private health insurance policy (either employer-provided or in the
market). The HITC was included in several of President George W. Bush’s budget
proposals (McClellan and Baicker 2002; Office of Management and Budget 2005) and is
a centerpiece of Wisconsin Representative Paul D. Ryan’s “Roadmap for America’s
Future” (Ryan 2010). By reducing the price of health insurance to eligible taxpayers and
extending the tax-favored treatment of health insurance to workers who lack access to
employer-provided health insurance, the HITC would be expected to increase the
percentage of low-income individuals and families covered by private health insurance.
But controversy has surrounded the extent to which workers would take up an
HITC and hence whether an HITC would reduce the number of uninsured individuals.
Pauly and Herring (2001, 2002), Pauly, Song, and Herring (2001), and Wozniak and
Emmons (2000) simulated a variety of HITC policies and found that a “reasonably
generous” credit could reduce the number of uninsured individuals by roughly 50
percent. However, simulations by Gruber (2000a,b) suggested that the HITC might
reduce the number of uninsured by only about 10 percent.1
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Pauly, Song, and Herring (2001) also note that health insurance tax credits could lead to broader changes
in health insurance markets—including greater price competition among insurers—that are not accounted
for in simulation models. Holtzblatt (2008) and Furman (2008) compare the HITC with other tax-based
approaches to reforming health insurance.
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A number of careful empirical studies have estimated workers’ responsiveness to
health insurance subsidies and changes in premiums, but the range of estimates produced
by these studies is disturbingly wide. Estimated price elasticities of health insurance takeup range from close to 0 (Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin 1997; Blumberg, Nichols,
and Banthin 2001) to approximately –1.2 (Gruber and Poterba 1994; Marquis et al.
2005). We review these studies more fully in the conclusion, but the wide range of
estimates suggests a useful role for further research on how workers would respond to
health insurance subsidies.
In this paper, our goal is to obtain direct evidence on the effect of refundable tax
credits on the health insurance coverage of low-earning workers. We do this by
examining a supplemental credit that Congress added to the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) during 1991, 1992, and 1993. This policy provided a refundable tax credit of up
to $428 in 1991 ($451 in 1992, and $465 in 1993) to EITC-eligible households that
bought health insurance for a qualifying child. We treat this supplemental credit as a
natural experiment and estimate its impact on the health insurance coverage of working
single mothers using a difference-in-differences approach applied to Current Population
Survey data.
We first describe the tax credit (section 2), the approach to estimation (section 3),
and the data we use (section 4). We then present the main findings (section 5), which
suggest that the HITC increased private health insurance coverage of low-education
working single mothers by about 6 percentage points (from a base of slightly less than 16
percent). Section 5 also reports several falsification (or “placebo”) tests. Section 6 reports
a range of sensitivity tests, including checks for whether the HITC affected labor supply,
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and whether the findings could be biased by Medicaid crowd-out, state-level economic
conditions, state AFDC waivers that preceded federal welfare reform, and state-level
EITCs. Section 7 concludes by examining whether the implications of the findings make
sense in light of the number of HITCs that were actually claimed, and by comparing the
implications of the HITC findings with existing estimates of the price elasticity of health
insurance take-up.

2. Background: The Health Insurance Tax Credit, 1991–1993
When Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990,
it added a supplemental credit for health insurance purchases to the basic Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) program (U.S. Government Accountability Office 1991, 1993). This
HITC was a refundable tax credit for low-income workers with one or more children who
bought health insurance—either employer-provided or private nongroup—covering the
child or children. The credit offset only the cost of health insurance and did not cover copayments, deductibles, or out-of-pocket health expenses. To encourage participation, the
credit was refundable, so taxpayers with no federal income tax liability could still receive
a payment from the Internal Revenue Service. The HITC was repealed effective
December 31, 1993, so it was available only during tax years 1991, 1992, and 1993.2
The HITC had the same eligibility criteria as the EITC: To receive a credit, a
household needed earnings and a qualifying child. To qualify, a child had to meet three
requirements: (1) be a child, stepchild, grandchild, or foster or adopted child of the
taxpayer; (2) have the same place of residence as the taxpayer for more than half the tax
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See U.S. Government Accountability Office (1991, 1993, 1994) for discussions of why Congress
eliminated the credit. We touch on these reasons later in this section and in the conclusion.
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year; and (3) be under age 19 (or 24 if a full-time student) or be permanently disabled.
Unlike the basic EITC, the HITC remained the same regardless of the number of
qualifying children in the family.
The HITC schedule closely followed the EITC’s.3 In 1991, a taxpayer with
earnings and a qualifying child could receive a credit up to $428 if he or she bought
private health insurance that covered the child. For households with earned incomes of $1
to $7,140, the credit was 6 percent of earned income. For households with earnings
between $7,140 and $11,250, the credit was $428 (6 percent of $7,140). For households
with earnings between $11,250 and $21,250, the credit phased out at a rate of 4.28
percent per marginal dollar earned and fell to $0 for earnings at or above $21,250 (see
Figure A1). In 1991, the maximum HITC of $428 was 36 percent of the maximum EITC
of $1,192. Like the EITC schedule, the HITC schedule was indexed to inflation.
In 1991, the HITC’s first year, the average credit was $233, or 23 percent of the
reported average annual health insurance premium of $1,029. Also in 1991, 2.3 million
taxpayers received health insurance credits of $496 million (U.S. Government
Accountability Office 1991). A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study
(1994) estimated that the take-up rate for the HITC in 1991 (its first year) was in the
range of 19 to 26 percent.4 In contrast, the take-up rate for the regular EITC was 80 to 86
percent. The GAO attributed the relatively low HITC take-up rate to two factors. First,
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Table A1 in the Appendix gives details of the HITC schedules and of the EITC schedules in the years
before, during, and after the HITC existed. Figure A1 in the Appendix is a graphical representation of the
HITC and EITC schedules in 1991.
4
This take-up rate is based on GAO’s (1994) estimate from the March 1992 CPS that about 8.8 million
families were eligible for the HITC in 1991; however, our tabulations suggest that this is an estimate not of
the number of eligible families but eligible individuals. Our tabulations suggest that 5.2 families were
eligible for the HITC in 1991, which implies an HITC take-up rate of about 44 percent. This latter estimate
seems reasonable in light of Scholz’s (1994) estimate that the 1990 EITC take-up rate was 80 to 86 percent.
We thank Paul Fronstin for advice on this point.
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interviews with taxpayers at IRS service sites in six cities suggested that fewer than 30
percent of EITC-eligible taxpayers knew the credit existed. Second, the GAO suggested
the credit was too modest to induce low-income workers to buy health insurance.
The GAO’s findings appear to have played a role in persuading Congress to
eliminate the HITC in 1993 (effective 1994). However, as the evidence below suggests,
the implicit conclusion that the HITC was ineffective may have been premature. Given
the attention paid to tax credits for health insurance in the intervening years, it is curious
that no analysis of the HITC’s impact on health insurance coverage appears to exist.

3. Approach to Estimation
We treat the HITC as a natural experiment and adopt a difference-in-differences
approach to estimating its effects on the health insurance coverage of working single
mothers with less than a high school education—hereafter, low-education working single
mothers. The approach follows a large literature on the labor supply effects of the EITC
including Eissa and Leibman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), Eissa and Hoynes
(2004), and Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2006).
The population potentially affected by the HITC consisted of low-income
working families with children. If the HITC had any effect on private health insurance
coverage, then the coverage of low-income working families with children would have
been greater than otherwise during 1991, 1992, and 1993. For three reasons, we focus on
the HITC’s possible effect on private health insurance of low-education working single
mothers. First, working single mothers were roughly 44 percent of all EITC-eligible
households in 1990, making them the largest group of taxpayers eligible for the EITC and
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hence for the HITC (Liebman 2000). Second, for households headed by a single woman,
we can plausibly abstract from decisions made jointly with other family members (Eissa
and Liebman 1996). Third, by focusing on high school dropouts, we can estimate the
effect of the HITC on a group that is likely to be eligible (because it is likely to have low
earnings) without conditioning explicitly on income or earnings. Conditioning on income
or earnings is ruled out because the EITC creates incentives for earners to change their
hours of work so as to qualify for the credit (Eissa and Hoynes 2006). Accordingly, our
main “treatment” group is low-education working single mothers.
A convincing difference-in-differences analysis requires a comparison or
“control” group that is as similar as possible to the treatment group without being eligible
for the HITC. In particular, we want a control group whose trend in health insurance
coverage would have been the same as low-education working single mothers’ trend if
the latter had not been affected by the HITC (Angrist and Krueger 1999; Blundell and
MaCurdy 1999). Following Eissa and Liebman (1996), we choose working single women
without children and with less than high school as the comparison group for loweducation working single mothers because, although they do not have children (and
hence are ineligible for the EITC and HITC), they face essentially similar labor markets
and economic conditions. As Figure 1 shows, the two groups had similar trends in health
insurance coverage in the years preceding the HITC.
Two concerns invariably arise with the difference-in-differences approach. First,
if the treatment and control groups do differ in their characteristics, each may be affected
differently by contemporaneous shocks (other than the HITC). In this case, the
difference-in-differences approach may still be valid if we can control convincingly for

6

observables that capture characteristics of individuals that are correlated with health
insurance coverage. Second, the difference-in-differences estimator may be contaminated
if the compositions of the treatment and control groups change over time. In the present
case, changes in tax and welfare programs increased the work incentives of single
mothers between 1984 and 1996 (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, 2001). If single mothers
who entered the labor force in later years were more likely to work part-time and hence
less likely to have employer-provided health insurance, then changes in the
characteristics of single mothers could have blunted any rise in private health insurance
that may have occurred as a result of the HITC. We can again mitigate this problem by
controlling for observable characteristics using regression, but it will also be important to
examine the samples carefully to see whether and how much they did in fact change over
time. We do this below in section 6.1.
In the case of the HITC, a third issue arises—the treatment is in fact a
combination of the HITC and increases in the EITC. As Appendix Table A1 shows, in
the years preceding adoption of the HITC (1988–1990), the maximum credit under the
EITC increased by 3, 4, and 5 percent per year ($23, $36, and $43). In contrast, during
the HITC years (1991–1993) the maximum EITC increased by 25, 8, and 11 percent per
year ($239, $89, and $110). Clearly, the increased generosity of the EITC may have
contributed to any effect we attribute to the HITC—the specific subsidy of $428 to $465
targeted on private health insurance—and we have no ready method for disentangling the
contributions of each. Accordingly, when we refer to an HITC effect below, it should be
understood that we are referring to an affect of the HITC combined with the above
increases in the EITC.
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The model we estimate can be written:
Pr(coveredi =1|•) = F[β0 + β1 treatgroupi + β2 HITCt + β3 treatgroupi×HITCt + Xi β]

(1)

where i indexes individuals and t indexes years; coveredi is a binary indicator of private
health insurance coverage; treatgroupi equals one for a working single woman with a
dependent child and less than high school, and zero otherwise; HITCt equals one for
1991, 1992, and 1993 (years during which the HITC was in effect), and zero for 1988,
1989, and 1990 (years before the HITC was in effect); and treatgroupi×HITCt captures
the change in coverage rates for working single mothers, relative to working single
women without children, after the HITC took effect.
In the basic specification we estimate, the vector of controls Xi includes age,
indicators of race (white, black, and other), indicators of number of children (under age 6,
aged 6–18, and aged 19–24 and a full-time student), indicators of work status (fulltime/full-year, full-time/part-year, part-time/full-year, and part-time/part-year),5 earned
income,6 and unearned income.7 For some of the specification tests reported in Table 8,
we include additional controls, as described later. We let F denote the standard normal
cumulative density and estimate equation (1) as a probit.

4. Data
We estimate equation (1) using data from the March 1989–1994 Annual
Demographic Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS), which provide
5

Full-year work implies at least 50 weeks of work in the previous year. Full-time work implies usual
weekly hours of 35 or more in the previous year.
6
Earned income includes income from wages, salaries, and self-employment.
7
Unearned income includes income from unemployment compensation, worker's compensation, social
security or railroad retirement, supplemental security, public assistance or welfare, veteran payments,
survivor benefits, disability, retirement funds, interest, dividends, rent, educational assistance, child
support, alimony, contributions, financial assistance from friends, and other nonearnings.
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information for tax years 1988 through 1993. Respondents to the March 1989, 1990, and
1991 CPS constitute a before-HITC sample (tax years 1988, 1989, and 1990).
Respondents to the March 1992, 1993, and 1994 CPS constitute a during-HITC sample
(tax years 1991, 1992, and 1993). The relevant unit of observation is the tax-filing unit,
which in the CPS implies allocating primary families and subfamilies to separate taxfiling units.
The sample includes women aged 19 to 448 who worked (had annual hours
greater than zero), were single (never married, widowed, or divorced), and had less than a
high school education. We exclude women who reported negative earnings, those in
school full-time, those who were separated from their spouses, and those who reported
being ill or disabled. The resulting sample, after pooling all six years, includes 3,661
observations.
We allocate working single women with at least one dependent child to the
treatment group, and working single women without a child to the control group. We
consider any child in the tax-filing unit who was under age 19 (or under age 24 if a fulltime student) to be a dependent child for tax purposes. Consistent with the EITC
literature, we do not try to impose the support or residency test for HITC eligibility.9
For two reasons, we limit the analysis to 1988 through 1993 and do not attempt to
estimate the effect of the HITC’s repeal. First, when Congress passed the OBRA of 1993,
which repealed the HITC, it enacted the largest expansion of the EITC in the credit’s
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We restrict the sample to women aged 19 to 44 because women in this age range are most likely to have at
least one dependent child (a child under age 19 or under age 24 and a full-time student who lives at home).
When women aged 45 to 54 are added to the sample, the findings are essentially similar (available on
request).
9
This is mainly due to limitations of the CPS. However, using data from the SIPP and IRS, Scholz (1994)
shows that the support test does not greatly change estimates of EITC eligibility.
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history (see Appendix Table A1; Baughman and Dickert-Conlin 2003). In 1993, a mother
of one child with earnings up to $7,750 could receive a credit of 18.5 percent of earned
income, resulting in a maximum credit of $1,434. In 1994, the credit rate rose to 26.3
percent of earned income, resulting in a maximum credit of $2,038. Also beginning in
1994, eligibility for the credit was expanded to include families with no children, for
whom the credit was 7.65 percent of earnings up to $4,000 (for a maximum 1994 credit
of $306). As a result, the effects of repealing the HITC are confounded with the EITC
expansion of 1994–1996.
The second reason for restricting the analysis to 1988 through 1993 is that the
CPS remained unchanged throughout this period. In March 1988, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics modified the CPS health insurance questions to capture more accurately the
insurance coverage of dependents. The next important revisions to the CPS health
insurance questions occurred in March 1995, when BLS introduced a more detailed set of
health insurance questions. This led to an increase in the number of persons reporting
employer-provided coverage.10
During the years we examine, the CPS health insurance questions read as follows:
75A. Other than government sponsored policies, health insurance can be obtained
privately or through a current or former employer or union. Was anyone in this
household covered by health insurance of this type at any time during 19xx [last
year]?
75B. Who was that?
75C. Was …’s health insurance coverage from a plan in …’s own name?

10

In particular, previous surveys asked about employer coverage as a subset of private coverage, but
beginning in March 1995 the survey asked separate questions about employer-provided and other types of
private health insurance. Appendix T of Unicon (2005) is a good discussion of changes in the CPS health
insurance questions.
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75F. What other persons were covered by this health insurance policy? Possible
answers are Spouse, Children in household, Children not in the household, Other,
and No one.
These questions allow us to define three alternative measures of health insurance:
1. private insurance coverage, defined broadly to include coverage by a privately
purchased or employer-provided health insurance plan, whether or not in the
respondent’s own name (that is, positive responses to questions 75A and 75B)
2. private insurance in the respondent’s own name (a subset of the first definition
because it implies a positive response to question 75C)
3. private insurance in the respondent’s own name that covers children in
household (a subset of the second definition because it implies a “children in
household” response to question 75F)
Table 1 shows average private health insurance coverage rates for working single
mothers and working single women without children during 1988–1993, using the
measures of coverage defined above. For single mothers, the rate of insurance coverage
in the respondent’s own name fell by 5.4 percentage points (from 32.3 to 27 percent);
however, only about one-fifth of this decrease occurred after 1990. For single women
without children, the coverage rate also fell somewhat between 1988 and 1990, but fell
sharply after 1990 (from 37.8 to 20.9 percent). A likely explanation for the continued
drop after 1990 is the recession of 1991, which would have reduced both employment
and access to employer-provided health insurance of single women.
In the following analysis, the outcome of interest is coverage by private health
insurance, defined as whether a working single woman has private insurance in her own
name that covers her child or children. We focus on this outcome because the HITC
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could be used only to purchase a health insurance policy—either in the market or through
an employer or union—covering a qualifying child. Figure 1 graphs the coverage rates
for single mothers and single women without children.11
Table 2 displays mean characteristics of working single mothers and working
single women without children pooled for 1988–1993. The two groups differ in some
important ways. Relative to single women without children, single mothers are more
likely to be black (33.6 versus 14.7 percent) and less likely to work full-time, full-year
(37.8 versus 49.1 percent). Also, single mothers have lower average earnings than single
women without children ($7,257 versus $8,686).
Table 3 displays summary statistics for both single mothers and single women
without children in the before-HITC and during-HITC periods. With one exception, the
characteristics of both single mothers and single women without children appear fairly
stable. The exception is that the percentage of women (both single mothers and single
women without children) working full-time, full-year dropped by 2.5 percentage points
during the HITC period, reflecting the recession of 1991–1992.

5. Empirical Findings
5.1. Main findings—single women with less than high school
Table 4 displays the average private health insurance coverage rates for single
mothers and single women without children in the years before and during the HITC. The
first row shows that health insurance coverage for single mothers fell by 2.4 percentage
11

Note that the private health insurance variable is constructed as “private insurance in own name that
covers children” for single mothers and as “private insurance in own name” for single women without
children. In an earlier version of this paper, we defined the private insurance variable as “private insurance
in own name” for both single mothers and single women without children. The estimates we obtained
(available on request) are essentially similar to those we report in this section and the next.
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points between 1988–1990 and 1991–1993. The second row shows that, over the same
period, coverage fell for single women without children by 9 percentage points. The
implication is that, after netting out the declining trend in insurance coverage, the private
health insurance coverage of single mothers was higher by 6.5 percentage points than it
would have been without the HITC. The bootstrap standard error of this point estimate is
0.031.
Table 5 displays estimates of the key coefficients in equation (1).12 Specification
1 includes no control variables. Specification 2 controls for age, race (white, black, and
other), number of children under age 6, number of children aged 6–18, and number of
children aged 19–24 and a full-time student. Specification 3 controls in addition for work
status (full-time/full-year, full-time/part-year, part-time/full-year, and part-time/partyear), earned income, and unearned income.
In specification 1, the coefficient on treatgroup is –0.145 and statistically
significant (p-value = 0.000). With the addition of demographic characteristics in
specification 2, it falls to –0.080 (p-value = 0.006). In specification 3, when we control
for work status and income along with demographic characteristics, it changes slightly
from –0.080 to –0.084 (p-value = 0.000). That the coefficient on treatgroup falls as
controls are added to the model (between specifications 1 and 2) suggests that observable
characteristics other than the presence of children are important in explaining the
difference between single mothers and single women without children in private health
insurance coverage.
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As described in the appendix, we follow DeLeire (2004) and obtain the probit DD estimator as the
discrete double difference of the standard normal cumulative distribution function, averaged over all
observations in the sample.
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In specification 1, the coefficient on HITC is negative (–0.090) and statistically
significant (p-value = 0.000). This is consistent with the declining trend in average health
insurance coverage for both single mothers and single women without children. Including
additional controls (specifications 2 and 3) leaves this estimate essentially unchanged.
The estimate of main interest is the coefficient on the interaction term. This is
essentially similar in size and statistical significance across the three specifications. The
estimate from specification 3 estimate is 0.063 (p-value = 0.019), which suggests that
private health insurance coverage of working single mothers with less than high school
was higher by 6.3 percentage points than it would have been without the HITC.13
5.2. Findings for single women with more education
We would expect the estimated effect of the HITC on single mothers who
completed high school (or who have some college or completed college) to be smaller
than its effect on single mothers with less than high school for a simple reason: Single
mothers with more education are less likely to be low earners and hence less likely to be
eligible for the EITC and HITC. Accordingly, single mothers with more education offer a
useful set of falsification (or “placebo”) tests of the estimates in Table 5: Finding that
single mothers with more education experienced coverage increases similar to those of
single mothers with less than high school would cast doubt on the findings in Table 5.
Table 6 displays tests of the hypothesis that single mothers with more education
were less likely than single mothers with less than high school to experience an HITC-

13

Eligibility for the HITC depended on the presence of a dependent child, so the credit could have affected
women’s fertility decisions. (Hotz and Scholz [2003] discuss fertility and the EITC.) To test whether the
findings are sensitive to the assumption that the presence of children is exogenous, we reestimated the basic
specification (Table 5, specification 3) after dropping single mothers with children younger than age 3 from
the treatment group. The findings are robust to this deletion.
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induced increase in health insurance coverage. We do this by estimating equation (1)
using samples of women with successively more educational attainment. The
specifications are the same as specification 3 of Table 5; that is, they include
demographic characteristics, indicators of work status, earned income, and unearned
income as controls. We refer to this specification as the “basic specification.”
The first row of Table 6 repeats the main finding from comparing single mothers
and single women with less than high school (specification 3 of Table 5). The second row
of Table 6 shows the results of comparing single mothers and single women with a high
school education. The estimate on the interaction term is 0.043 with a p-value of 0.002,
which suggests that the private health insurance coverage rate of single mothers with high
school was 4.3 percentage points higher than it would have been without the HITC. This
accords with the expectation that the HITC effect on single mothers should be less as
educational attainment increases.
The third and fourth rows of Table 6 show findings from comparisons for single
mothers with some college and with a college degree or more. As expected, these
comparisons produce still smaller estimated effects of the HITC on health insurance
coverage. For single mothers with some college, the estimated HITC effect on health
insurance coverage is 2.5 percentage points, but the estimate is imprecise (row 3 of Table
6). The estimated effect of the HITC on health insurance coverage of single women with
college or more is –0.006 percentage points—essentially zero. That these falsification
tests behave as expected, with negligible responses to the HITC among single mothers
who are increasing unlikely to be eligible for the HITC, tends to increase our confidence
that Table 5 is identifying an HITC effect for low-education single women.
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5.3. Findings by work status
As another falsification test, we explore whether the effect of the HITC differed
by work status. Because non-workers were not eligible for the HITC, we would not
expect to observe HITC effects on the health insurance coverage of non-working single
mothers. To test this hypothesis, we estimated equation (1) using a sample that includes
3,136 non-working single mothers with less than high school in addition to the 3,661
working single mothers used to obtain Table 5’s estimates. We allowed the HITC to have
a differential effect on the health insurance coverage of working single mothers and nonworking single mothers. The estimated HITC effect for non-working single mothers (not
reported in a table) is –0.004 percentage points (p-value = 0.718), compared with an
estimated effect for working single mothers of 6.5 percentage points (p-value = 0.018).
Accordingly, the HITC regime appears to have had no effect on a group of HITCineligible women, many of whom would likely have been eligible had they worked. (We
explore the possible effect of the HITC on labor supply below.)
5.4. Findings disaggregated by year
The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 are restrictive because they aggregate the three
before-HITC years and the three during-HITC years. We would like to know whether it is
reasonable to restrict the estimated effect of the HITC to be the same in the three duringHITC years (1991, 1992, and 1993). Accordingly, we estimate a model that includes a set
of year dummies (for 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, and 1993), a treatment group dummy, and
interactions of the treatment and year dummies. We estimate this model for the main
group of interest—low-education working single women—and report estimates from a
specification analogous to the basic specification. The estimates are year-specific
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difference-in-differences estimates of the HITC effect on private health insurance
coverage rates.
The estimates, reported in Table 7, suggest that the 1991, 1992, and 1993
coverage rates of single mothers with less than high school were higher by 6.4, 7.2, and
11 percentage points than they would have been in the absence of the HITC (although
only the estimate for 1993 has a p-value less than 0.05). The pattern of these estimates—
increasing over time—has at least two possible interpretations. First, it could be that the
impact of the HITC increased as the existence of the program became known and its
implications better understood. This would be consistent with the pattern of participation
in several social programs (Madrian and Shea 2001; Remler and Glied 2003; Currie
2006). Alternatively, it could be that we have omitted one or more variables that affected
the health insurance coverage of low-education single mothers (but not other loweducation single women). We investigate the latter possibility next.

6. Sensitivity Tests
This section describes findings from four sets of sensitivity tests. We begin by
exploring possible effects of the HITC on labor supply. We then attempt to control for
factors affecting private health insurance in the early 1990s other than the HITC: (1)
expansion of the Medicaid program, (2) state-level economic conditions and other statespecific effects, and (3) welfare reform and the introduction of state-level EITCs.
6.1. The HITC and labor supply
Several empirical studies have found that the EITC substantially increases labor
force participation of eligible groups (see the reviews by Hotz and Scholz 2003 and Eissa
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and Hoynes 2006). Because the HITC’s structure was essentially similar to the EITC’s,
the HITC may also have drawn women into the labor force. If so, then the composition of
working single mothers during the HITC years may have differed from the composition
before the HITC. Such compositional change, if substantial, could contaminate the
difference-in-differences estimator.
To examine whether the HITC substantially affected labor force participation we
estimate a model along the lines of equation (1), but using employment (a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a woman reported working at least one hour during the year, 0
otherwise) as the dependent variable. The specification is the same as specification 1 of
Table 5. The estimates, reported in row 2 of Table 8, suggest that during the HITC years,
labor force participation of low-education single mothers was higher by 2.1 percentage
points; however, the estimated HITC effect is insignificant at conventional levels (pvalue = 0.40). It follows that, if the HITC did induce a change in the composition of
working single mothers, it was likely small and hence unlikely to overturn the main
finding from Table 5.
6.2. Medicaid crowd-out
During the years we are examining, eligibility for Medicaid expanded
substantially to include low-income pregnant women and children with no ties to AFDC
(see Appendix Table A2). Because Medicaid and private health insurance are potential
substitutes—they offer similar health coverage, and Medicaid is much less costly—
Medicaid expansion may have drawn some low-income single mothers out of private
health insurance and into Medicaid. Cutler and Gruber (1996) first referred to such
substitution as “crowding out,” and to the extent it exists, the estimates in Tables 5, 6, and
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7 could understate the HITC’s effect on private health insurance coverage. Alternatively,
the availability of the HITC could conceivably have drawn some low-income single
mothers out of Medicaid and into private health insurance, in which case the estimates in
Table 5 would overstate the net impact of the HITC on health insurance coverage.
To address these concerns, we estimate variants of equation (1) that use two
alternative dependent variables: medicaid, a dummy indicator of whether a woman had
Medicaid coverage, and insured, a dummy indicator of whether a woman had coverage
from either Medicaid or private health insurance. In the first case, the question addressed
is whether Medicaid coverage of low-education single mothers changed (relative to loweducation single women without children) during the HITC years. In the second case, the
question addressed is whether overall health insurance coverage of low-education single
mothers changed (relative to low-education single women without children) during the
HITC years.
Row 3 of Table 8 displays findings from the model in which medicaid is the
dependent variable. The estimates offer only marginal evidence that relative Medicaid
coverage of low-education single mothers was higher during the HITC period than in the
prior years. (The point estimate is 1.4 percentage points, but the estimate is imprecise.)
We interpret this finding as evidence that, if the Medicaid expansions did crowd out
private health insurance during the HITC years, crowd-out was slight.
Row 4 of Table 8 displays findings from the model in which insured (by either
private health insurance or Medicaid) is the dependent variable. The estimates suggest
that during the HITC period, relative net health insurance coverage of low-education
single mothers was higher by 8.4 percentage points (p-value = 0.007) than in the
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preceding years. Estimates from the basic specification in row 1 (from Table 5,
specification 3) suggest that the HITC was the main factor in this net increase in health
insurance coverage, and that Medicaid expansion played a relatively minor role.
Together, rows 1, 3, and 4 suggest that 6.3 of the 8.4 percentage points were due to an
increase in private coverage, and 1.4 percentage points were due to an increase in
Medicaid coverage (although the latter is not statistically significant). A relatively small
residual (0.7 percentage points) cannot be explained by either the HITC or changes in
Medicaid.
6.3. State-level economic conditions and state fixed effects
It is also possible that changes in private health insurance coverage of loweducation single mothers were related to state-level economic conditions or to state fixed
effects. To account for these possibilities, rows 5, 6, and 7 of Table 8 report estimates
from models that successively add to the basic specification a set of state dummy
variables (to control for time-invariant state-level effects on health coverage), the yearspecific contemporaneous state unemployment rate (to control for cyclical labor market
influences on health insurance coverage), and both state fixed effects and the yearspecific state unemployment rate.
The findings reported in rows 5, 6, and 7 of Table 8 suggest that including these
state-level controls produces estimates that are essentially similar to the basic
specification—an increase in single mothers’ private health insurance coverage of
roughly 6.5 percentage points (with p-values less than 0.02).
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6.4. Welfare reform and state EITCs
Although the findings in Table 5 are consistent with the HITC increasing private
health insurance coverage of low-education single mothers, an alternative explanation for
this increase is the welfare reforms adopted by some states after 1990. California,
Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, and Utah all implemented welfare waivers in 1993
(DeLeire, Levine, and Levy 2006). These waivers changed the nature of AFDC by
imposing time limits on AFDC participation and introducing work requirements for
AFDC participants (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000). If these changes moved single
mothers into the labor market and onto private (employer-provided) health insurance, the
estimates in Tables 5, 6, and 7 could overstate the HITC’s effect on private health
insurance coverage.
To address this possibility, we restrict the sample to low-education single women
in states that did not have welfare waivers. Row 8 of Table 8 shows that restricting the
sample in this way leaves the estimated HITC impact on single mothers essentially
unchanged—the private health insurance coverage of single mothers increases by 6.3
percentage points (p-value = 0.035).
In addition to implementing welfare reforms, several states made changes in their
EITCs during the period we examine. By 1993, six states had their own EITCs:
Minnesota, Vermont, and Wisconsin had refundable EITCs, while Iowa, Maryland, and
Rhode Island had non-refundable EITCs (Baughman 2005). When we restrict the sample
to single women in states that did not have state-level EITCs, we again see no major
change in the estimated effect of the HITC. The estimates reported in row 9 of Table 8
show a relative increase in the coverage rate of single mothers of 6.5 percentage points
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(p-value = 0.017), suggesting that changes in state EITCs were not responsible for the
HITC effect we observed earlier.
Row 10 of Table 8 shows the findings when we restrict the sample to women in
states with neither welfare reforms nor state-level EITCs. Again, the main findings are
essentially unchanged.
Overall, the findings in Table 8 suggest that Table 5’s estimated HITC effect is
robust to several alternative specifications, sample restrictions, and other tests.

7. Discussion and Conclusion
A refundable tax credit for health insurance has been frequently proposed as a
policy to expand health insurance coverage in the United States, but the extent to which
an HITC would be effective has been a matter of debate. The Health Insurance Tax
Credit of 1991 through 1993 offers a natural experiment that we have used to examine
the effectiveness of credits. The main findings in Table 5 suggest that, as a result of the
HITC, health insurance coverage among low-education working single mothers was
higher than it would otherwise have been by roughly 6 percentage points—that is,
without the HITC, only 15.7 percent of these women would have had health insurance
covering their children during 1991–1993, whereas the actual (estimated) coverage rate
was 22 percent (Tables 4 and 5). This main finding appears to stand up to a variety of
falsification and sensitivity tests (see Tables 6 and 8 and the accompanying discussions).
It makes sense to perform two further checks on the main findings. First, we
explore whether enough households received an HITC to yield an effect of the size we
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have estimated. Second, we compare our findings with previous evidence on the price
elasticity of health insurance.
Did enough households claim the HITC to account for the estimated effect? In
order for the estimated HITC effects reported in rows 1 and 2 of Table 6 to make sense,
36,500 single mothers with less than high school would need to have been newly covered
by private health insurance, and 80,500 single mothers with only high school would need
to have been newly covered.14
In light of the number of HITCs actually claimed, are such increases reasonable?
Internal Revenue Service records tabulated by the GAO (1994) show that about 2.3
million tax returns claimed the HITC for tax year 1991. (Congress did not request GAO
reports on the HITC in subsequent years.) Because IRS records do not include data on
education, we need to impute the number of single mothers with less than high school
(and with only high school) who claimed the HITC. We do this by applying population
percentages from the CPS to the number of HITCs actually claimed. Tabulations of the
March 1992 CPS suggest that, in 1991, about 5.2 million families were HITC-eligible, of
whom 11.7 percent (608,000) were headed by single mothers with less than high school,
and 36.1 percent (1,877,000) were headed by single mothers with only high school.
Applying the population proportion of HITC-eligibles who were working single mothers
with less than high school (0.117) to the number of HITCs received (2.3 million) suggests
that about 269,100 of these women received a credit in 1991. By similar reasoning, about

14

The CPS estimate of the number of HITC-eligible single mothers with less than high school in 1991 is
608,000. Roughly 21 percent of these, or 127,000, had private health insurance. The estimated HITC effect
of 6 percentage points in Table 6, row 1, would imply 36,500 newly covered families as a result of the
HITC. We obtain the estimate for single mothers with only high school in a similar way.
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830,300 (0.361 of 2.3 million) working single mothers with only high school would have
received a credit in 1991.
Table 9 summarizes these imputations, which suggest that the estimated HITC
effects for single mothers with less than high school (Table 6, row 1) are reasonable if
13.6 percent of the HITCs that went to those women resulted in new private health
insurance coverage. Similarly, the estimated effects for single mothers with only high
school (Table 6, row 2) are reasonable if 9.7 percent of the HITCs claimed by those
women resulted in new coverage. This is clearly an exercise in judgment and heuristics;
however, we suggest that the estimates in Table 6 are plausible in light of the number of
HITCs claimed and the estimated number of HITC-eligible households.
Are the estimates we obtain from the HITC natural experiment consistent with
existing estimates of the responsiveness of health insurance to premium changes? The
main estimate we report implies a price elasticity of health insurance take-up of –1.27,
and a semi-elasticity (the percentage point change in coverage resulting from a one
percent increase in price15) of –0.24. We calculate these elasticities as follows: First, the
HITC we are examining covered 23 percent of the reported average annual health
insurance premium (U.S. Government Accountability Office 1991), which implies a 26
percent decrease in the insurance premium (taking a midpoints approach, 23/88.5 =
0.260). Also, the estimated 6.3 percentage-point increase in private health insurance
coverage of single mothers during 1991, 1992, and 1993 represents a 33 percent increase
in coverage (because from Table 4, 22 percent of single mothers were covered during the
HITC years, which implies a counterfactual coverage rate of 15.7 percent). Accordingly,

15

See Gruber and Poterba (1994) and Congressional Budget Office (2005) for useful discussions of
elasticity concepts in this literature.

24

a 26 percent reduction in the price of health insurance led to a 33 percent increase in
health insurance coverage, which implies an elasticity of –1.27. For the semi-elasticity, a
26 percent price reduction led to a 6.3 percentage point increase in coverage, giving a
semi-elasticity of –0.24.
As Table 10 shows, the price elasticity and semi-elasticity estimated from the
HITC natural experiment are at the elastic end of the range of existing estimates that
might be seen as comparable.16 The take-up elasticity we obtain from the HITC is similar
to Gruber and Poterba’s (1994) for single, self-employed workers, and at the elastic end
of the range found by Marquis et al. (2004).17 The semi-elasticities we obtain are at the
elastic end of the range estimated by Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin (1997) and
Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001), and are similar to those obtained by Marquis et
al. (2004) and the Congressional Budget Office (2005). The last two sets of estimates are
obtained from samples of employed individuals who are near poverty—workers who
should be similar to the low-education working single mothers we have examined.
Table 5’s findings suggest that enough eligible low-earning workers with children
would take up an HITC to significantly increase the health insurance coverage of such
workers and their children. In that sense, they appear favorable to the HITC.
Nevertheless, during the existence of the HITC, reports emerged that some insurers
offered policies of little real value that happened to cost the same amount as the credit.
Indeed, a Congressional investigation found that some insurers sold policies for children
16

In assembling Table 10, we gave priority to estimates based on lower-income, single workers in order to
show estimates for workers who are similar to low-education working single mothers. The empirical
literature has consistently estimated larger price elasticities for such workers than for higher-income and
married workers [for discussions, see Gruber and Poterba (1994) and Marquis et al. (2004)]. We have
included estimates both for those with and those without access to group health insurance, although
estimated elasticities for the latter are generally smaller than for the former (Marquis et al. 2004).
17
The take-up elasticity estimated from the HITC is larger than most others in Table 10 in part because the
base level of coverage for the sample we examine is so low.
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covering only “cancer, heart attacks, strokes, and other diseases that few children have”
(Solomon 2007). Senator Lloyd Bentsen, the HITC’s original sponsor, considered these
reported abuses serious enough that he led efforts to repeal the HITC. It is an open
question whether such concerns could be mitigated by a well-developed private health
insurance market or appropriate regulation.
Also, our rough-and-ready attempt to calculate how many low-education working
single mothers received the HITC (above and Table 9) suggests that the HITC went to
many who would have purchased health insurance even without the credit. This lack of
target efficiency may not be a major issue, given that the credits went to low-income
households. Still, it raises questions, discussed in some depth by Gruber (2008) about
whether the HITC is the most efficient way to expand health insurance coverage among
low-income households.
Finally, although the results presented here are consistent with the HITC
increasing health insurance coverage substantially, the analysis is hampered by small
sample sizes. It seems possible that further research using different data sources—panel
data in particular—could give further evidence by allowing observation of the same
individuals before and after adoption of the HITC.
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Table 1
Health insurance coverage rates for low-education working single mothers and
low-education working single women without children
1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

Private insurance

0.350

0.353

0.297

0.297

0.279

0.308

Private insurance in own name

0.323

0.325

0.276

0.278

0.255

0.270

Private insurance in own name
that covers children

0.221

0.249

0.218

0.209

0.197

0.202

Private insurance

0.466

0.409

0.414

0.367

0.320

0.272

Private insurance in own name

0.398

0.385

0.378

0.341

0.283

0.209

Single mothers

Single women without children

Notes: The data are from the March 1989–1994 Annual Demographic Supplements to the
Current Population Survey (CPS). The sample contains working single women with less
than a high school education. We define "working" as having positive hours and positive
earnings during the year. We exclude women who are in school full-time, those who are
separated from their spouse, and those who report being ill or disabled. Means are
tabulated using CPS March supplement weights. Sample sizes are 2,228 (single mothers)
and 1,433 (single women without children).
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Table 2
Summary statistics: low-education working single mothers and low-education
working single women without children
Single
mothers

Single women
without children

Age (years)

30.5

29.7

White (%)

63.8

81.0

Black (%)

33.6

14.7

2.6

4.4

Has children under age 6 (%)

48.6

0.0

Has children aged 6–18 (%)

69.9

0.0

Has children aged 19–24
and a full-time student (%)

2.0

0.0

Full-time, full-year (%)

37.8

49.1

Part-time, full-year (%)

8.9

9.2

Full-time, part-year (%)

31.7

29.0

Part-time, part-year (%)

21.6

12.8

Earned income ($)

7,257

8,686

Unearned income ($)

1,833

464

Number of observations

2,228

1,433

Variable

Other race (%)

Notes: See Table 1. Dollar amounts are converted to 1993 dollars using the Consumer
Price Index, All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).
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Table 3
Summary statistics for low-education working single mothers and low-education
working single women without children, before and during HITC
Single mothers

Variable

Before
HITC
(1988–90)

During
HITC
(1991–93)

Single women
without children
Before
HITC
(1988–90)

During
HITC
(1991–93)

Age (years)

30.3

30.7

29.6

29.8

White (%)

64.6

63.0

81.8

80.1

Black (%)

32.9

34.4

15.5

13.7

2.5

2.7

2.6

6.2

Has children under age 6 (%)

48.6

48.7

0.0

0.0

Has children aged 6–18 (%)

70.5

69.3

0.0

0.0

Has children aged 19–24
and a full-time student (%)

1.5

2.4

0.0

0.0

Full-time, full-year (%)

39.0

36.5

50.4

47.6

Part-time, full-year (%)

7.2

10.7

6.8

11.6

Full-time, part-year (%)

31.6

31.7

31.7

26.0

Part-time, part-year (%)

22.2

21.1

11.1

14.7

Earned income ($)

6,770

7,764

8,003

9,419

Unearned income ($)

1,599

2,077

472

455

Number of observations

1,153

1,075

741

692

Other race (%)

Notes: See Table 1. Dollar amounts are converted to 1993 dollars using the Consumer
Price Index, All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).
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Table 4
Private health insurance coverage rates for low-education working single mothers
and low-education working single women without children
Before HITC
(1988–1990)

During HITC
(1991–1993)

Difference

Single mothers

0.244
(0.013)
[1,153]

0.220
(0.013)
[1,075]

–0.024
(0.018)

Single women
without children

0.389
(0.018)
[741]

0.299
(0.017)
[692]

–0.090
(0.025)

Difference

–0.145
(0.022)

–0.080
(0.022)

—

—

0.065
(0.031)

Difference-in-differences

—

Notes: See Table 1. Figures are average rates of private health insurance coverage in own
name and covering a child. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample sizes in
brackets.
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Table 5
Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the HITC on private health insurance
coverage of low-education working single mothers from probit estimates of equation (1)
Dependent variable:

Specification

covered by private health insurance

(1)

(2)

(3)

–0.145
(0.020)

–0.080
(0.029)

–0.084
(0.026)

–0.090
(0.023)

–0.087
(0.022)

–0.104
(0.021)

0.065
(0.030)

0.060
(0.028)

0.063
(0.028)

Number of observations

3,661

3,661

3,661

Pseudo R-squared

0.020

0.061

0.256

treatgroup

HITC

treatgroup×HITC

Notes: See Table 1. Figures are estimated changes (marginal effects) in the probability of
private health insurance coverage in own name and covering a child from probit models.
Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Specification 1 includes no control variables.
Specification 2 includes age, indicators of race (white, black, and other), number of children
under age 6, number of children aged 6–18, and number of children aged 19–24 and a fulltime student. Specification 3 adds indicators of work status (full-time/full-year, full-time/partyear, part-time/full-year, and part-time/part-year), earned income, and unearned income to the
controls in specification 2. Estimated marginal effects for all regressors are reported in
Appendix Table A3.
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Table 6
Difference-in-differences estimates from alternative treatment and comparison groups
Dependent variable: covered by private health insurance

treatgroup

HITC

treatgroup×HITC

1.

Treatment group:
Single mothers with less than high school [N=2,228]
Control group:
Single women with less than high school [N =1,433]

–0.084
(0.026)

–0.104
(0.021)

0.063
(0.028)

2.

Treatment group:
Single mothers with high school [N=6,794]
Control group:
Single women with high school [N =6,608]

–0.166
(0.016)

–0.107
(0.011)

0.043
(0.016)

3.

Treatment group:
Single mothers with some college [N =3,630]
Control group:
Single women with some college [N =5,060 ]

–0.173
(0.020)

–0.098
(0.012)

0.025
(0.021)

4.

Treatment group:
Single mothers with college [N =1,179]
Control group:
Single women with college [N =5,736]

–0.184
(0.034)

–0.048
(0.009)

–0.006
(0.024)

Notes: Estimates in row 1 come from specification 3 of Table 5. Estimates in rows 2, 3, and 4 come from applying the
same model to different samples of women, as indicated.

38

Table 7
Difference-in-differences estimates of the change in private health insurance
coverage relative to 1990, low-education working single mothers
Dependent variable: covered by private health insurance
1988×treatgroup

0.025
(0.042)

1989×treatgroup

0.036
(0.044)

1990×treatgroup

—

1991×treatgroup

0.064
(0.046)

1992×treatgroup

0.072
(0.048)

1993×treatgroup

0.110
(0.046)

Number of observations

3,661

Pseudo R-squared

0.264

Notes: See Table 1. Figures are estimated changes in the probability of private
health insurance coverage from a probit model. Bootstrap standard errors are in
parentheses. The specification includes age, race, number of children, work
status, earned income, unearned income, and a set of year indicators. The
marginal effects of the complete set of regressors are reported in Appendix Table
A4.
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Table 8
Sensitivity tests for HITC effects on low-education working single mothers
Dependent variable: covered by private health
insurance (except rows 2, 3, and 4)

treatgroup

HITC

treatgroup×HITC

Number of
observations

Pseudo
R-squared

1.

Basic specification (Table 5, specification 3)

–0.084
(0.026)

–0.104
(0.021)

0.063
(0.028)

3,661

0.256

2.

Basic specification, but dependent variable is
whether employed
Basic specification, but dependent variable is
whether covered by Medicaid
Basic specification, but dependent variable is
covered by either private insurance or Medicaid

–0.263
(0.021)
0.129
(0.022)
–0.018
(0.027)

–0.063
(0.020)
0.059
(0.020)
–0.074
(0.027)

0.021
(0.404)
0.014
(0.025)
0.084
(0.030)

6,797

0.034

3,661

0.132

3,661

0.067

5.

Add state dummies to the basic specification

–0.090
(0.021)

–0.106
(0.020)

0.068
(0.028)

3,661

0.291

6.

Add state unemployment rate to the basic
specification

–0.085
(0.021)

–0.079
(0.021)

0.063
(0.029)

3,661

0.259

7.

Add state dummies and state unemployment
rate to the basic specification
Restrict sample to single women in states
without welfare waivers in 1993

–0.089
(0.021)
–0.089
(0.030)

–0.136
(0.023)
–0.120
(0.022)

0.067
(0.028)
0.063
(0.033)

3,661

0.292

2,845

0.268

Restrict sample to single women in states
without state EITCs
Restrict sample to single women in states
without welfare waivers in 1993 and without
state EITCs

–0.093
(0.027)
–0.102
(0.028)

–0.106
(0.020)
–0.125
(0.024)

0.065
(0.023)
0.067
(0.031)

3,484

0.258

2,668

0.270

3.
4.

8.
9.
10.

Notes: See Table 5. Estimates in row 1 (basic specification) come from specification 3 of Table 5. The basic specification
(row 1) includes age, race, number of children, work status, earned income, and unearned income as controls. Bootstrap
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 9
Implications of the estimates: Proportions of HITCs resulting in new health
insurance coverage

1. Covered by private health
insurance (from CPS)
2. Number newly covered
implied by estimated
effects in Table 6
3. HITC-eligible in 1991
(from CPS)
4. Received HITC in 1991
(imputed from sample
proportions)
5. Row 2/Row 4 (proportion
of HITCs resulting in new
coverage

Working single mothers
with less than high school

Working single mothers
with only high school

127,000

953,200

36,500

80,500

608,000

1,876,500

172,500
(= 2,300,000 × 0.117)

453,100
(= 2,300,000 × 0.361)

0.136

0.097

Note: Rows 1 and 3 report authors’ tabulations of the March 1992 Current Population
Survey. Row 2 reports the number of working single mothers newly covered by private
health insurance implied by the estimated HITC effects in Table 6, rows 1 and 2. Row 4
reports imputations based on IRS records of the number of HITCs claimed (from GAO
1994) and CPS sample proportions of HITC-eligible working single mothers with less
than high school and only high school. See text for discussion.

41

Table 10
Estimated price elasticities of health insurance (HI) take-up, selected studies
Study

Source of price variation

Sample

Gruber and Poterba (1994)

1986 Tax Reform Act

Single, self-employed workers

Marquis and Long (1995)

HI premium imputed to
family

Working families without
access to group HI
below 200% poverty
above 200% poverty
Chernew, Frick, and
Observed HI premium or
Single workers below 200%
McLaughlin (1997)
employee contribution
poverty
Blumberg, Nichols, and
Observed or imputed HI
Workers with children (or
Banthin (2001)
premium
married) aged 18 to 64 and
below 200% poverty
Long and Marquis (2002)
Public subsidy schedule
Low-income adults in
Washington State
Marquis, Buntin, Escarce,
HI premium imputed to
California families without
Kapur, and Yegian (2004)
individual
access to group HI
below 200% poverty,
age < 35, self-employed
below 200% poverty,
age < 35, not self-employed
Congressional Budget
Premium differences from
Individual workers without
Office (2005)
state-level regulations
access to group health plan
full sample
below 200% poverty
Cebi and Woodbury (2010) Introduction of Health
Working single mothers with
Insurance Tax Credit
less than high school
Sources: Reported estimates and (in some cases) authors' calculations from the papers cited.
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Elasticity of
take-up
–1.23

Semi-elasticity
of take-up
–1.78

–0.64 to –0.31
–0.45 to –0.27
–0.27 to –0.03

–0.09 to –0.07
–0.10 to –0.08
–0.19 to –0.03

–0.30 to –0.06

–0.28 to –0.05

–0.7 to –0.3

–0.06 to –0.04

–1.21 to –0.71

–0.14 to –0.10

–1.03 to –0.52

–0.24 to –0.21

–0.57
–0.84
–1.27

–0.09
–0.19
–0.24

Figure 1
Health insurance coverage rates for low-education working single mothers and loweducation working single women without children

Notes: See Table 1.
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Table A1
Earned Income Tax Credit parameters
Basic Tax Credit parameters, 1987–1996, nominal dollars
Tax year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
One child
Two children
1992
One child
Two children
1993
One child
Two children
1994
No child
One child
Two children
1995
No child
One child
Two children
1996
No child
One child
Two children

Phase-in
rate (%)

Phase-in Maximum
range ($) credit ($)

Phase-out
rate (%)

Phase-out
range ($)

14.00
14.00
14.00
14.00

0–6,080
0–6,240
0–6,500
0–6,810

851
874
910
953

10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00

6,920–15,432
9,840–18,576
10,240–19,340
10,730–20,264

16.70
17.30

0–7,140
0–7,140

1,192
1,235

11.93
12.36

11,250–21,250
11,250–21,250

17.60
18.40

0–7,520
0–7,520

1,324
1,384

12.57
13.14

11,840–22,370
11,840–22,370

18.50
19.50

0–7,750
0–7,750

1,434
1,511

13.21
13.93

12,200–23,050
12,200–23,050

7.65
26.30
30.00

0–4,000
0–7,750
0–8,245

306
2,038
2,528

7.65
15.98
17.98

5,000–9,000
11,000–23,755
11,000–25,296

7.65
34.00
36.00

0–4,100
0–6,160
0–8,640

314
2,094
3,110

7.65
15.98
20.22

5,130–9,500
11,290–24,396
11,290–26,673

7.65
34.00
40.00

0–4,220
0–6,330
0–8,890

323
2,152
3,556

7.65
15.98
21.06

5,280–9,500
11,610–25,078
11,610–28,495

Health Insurance Tax Credit parameters, 1991–1993, nominal dollars
Tax year
1991
1992
1993

Phase-in
rate (%)
6.00
6.00
6.00

Phase-in
range ($)

Maximum
credit ($)

0–7,140
0–7,520
0–7,750

428
451
465

Phase-out
rate (%)

Phase-out
range ($)

4.28
4.28
4.28

11,250–21,250
11,840–22,370
12,200–23,050

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (1991, 1994); U.S. House of
Representatives (1998).
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Table A2
Major legislative changes affecting low-income women, 1987–1994
Tax year
1988
1991

1992
1993
1994

Tax year
April 1987
July 1988
October 1988

July 1989
April 1990
July 1991

Earned Income Tax Credit
The beginning and end of the phase-out range increased by about
$3,000.
The credit rates rose by 2 percentage points.
Additional credits established for families with two or more children.
The new increment to the maximum credit for a second child was $43.
Supplemental credits added for child health insurance premiums and
children less than one year of age.
The credit rates rose by one percentage point.
The increment to the maximum credit for a second child rose to $60.
The credit rates rose by one percentage point.
The increment to the maximum credit for a second child rose to $77.
The credit rates rose by about 10 percentage points.
The increment to the maximum credit for a second child rose to $490.
Supplemental credits for health insurance and children less than one
year of age repealed.
Small credits established for taxpayers without children and between the
ages of 25 and 65.
The IRS began to notify eligible taxpayers of the advance payment
option, which had been available since 1979.
Medicaid
States permitted to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age two
in families below 100 percent of the poverty line.
States permitted to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age five
in families below 100 percent of the poverty line.
States permitted to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age
eight in families below 100 percent of the poverty line, and to children
under age one in families below 185 percent of the poverty line.
States required to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age one
in families below 75 percent of the poverty line.
States required to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age six in
families below 133 percent of the poverty line.
States required to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age 19 in
families below 100 percent of the poverty line.

Source: U.S. General Accountability Office (1993); U.S. House of Representatives
(1998); Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000).
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Table A3
Estimated marginal effects from probit models underlying Table 5 estimates
Dependent variable:
covered by private health insurance
treatgroup
HITC
treatgroup×HITC
Age

(1)

(2)

(3)

–0.145
(0.020)
–0.090
(0.023)
0.065
(0.030)
—

–0.080
(0.029)
–0.087
(0.022)
0.060
(0.028)
0.011
(0.001)
–0.012
(0.035)
–0.057
(0.036)
–0.046
(0.015)
–0.030
(0.010)
–0.034
(0.053)

–0.084
(0.026)
–0.104
(0.021)
0.063
(0.028)
0.005
(0.001)
–0.009
(0.031)
–0.033
(0.033)
–0.004
(0.014)
–0.019
(0.009)
–0.029
(0.047)
0.259
(0.034)
0.077
(0.035)
0.138
(0.027)
—

White

—

Black

—

Number of children under age 6

—

Number of children aged 6-18

—

Number of children aged 19-24
and a full-time student

—

Full-time, full-year

—

—

Part-time, full-year

—

—

Full-time, part-year

—

—

Part-time, part-year

—

—

Earned income

—

—

Unearned income

—

—

Number of observations

3,661

3,661

3,661

Pseudo R-squared

0.020

0.061

0.256

0.018
(0.002)
0.005
(0.003)

Notes: Figures are estimated changes in the probability of private health insurance
coverage from probit models. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A4
Estimated marginal effects from probit model underlying Table 7 estimates
Dependent variable: covered by private health insurance
treatgroup
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1988×treatgroup
1989×treatgroup
1990×treatgroup
1991×treatgroup
1992×treatgroup
1993×treatgroup
Age
White
Black
Number of children under age 6
Number of children aged 6–18
Number of children aged 19–24
and a full-time student

–0.104
(0.032)
0.036
(0.036)
0.012
(0.039)
—
–0.037
(0.034)
–0.094
(0.034)
–0.144
(0.034)
0.025
(0.042)
0.036
(0.044)
—
0.064
(0.046)
0.072
(0.048)
0.110
(0.046)
0.005
(0.001)
–0.008
(0.030)
–0.031
(0.034)
–0.004
(0.013)
–0.019
(0.009)
–0.027
(0.055)

(continued)
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Table A4 (continued)
Dependent variable: covered by private health insurance
Full-time, full-year
Part-time, full-year
Full-time, part-year
Part-time, part-year
Earned income
Unearned income

0.257
(0.034)
0.077
(0.039)
0.138
(0.028)
—
0.018
(0.002)
0.006
(0.003)

Number of observations

3,661

Pseudo R-squared

0.264

Notes: Figures are estimated changes in the probability of private health insurance
coverage from a probit model. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure A1
Earned Income Tax Credit and Health Insurance Tax Credit schedules, 1991

Health
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400
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50

21,250

Difference-in-differences estimates in linear probability and probit models
In a linear probability model, calculating a difference-in-differences (DD)
estimate is straightforward. In the simplest case, we have two time periods (pre and post)
and two groups (control and treatment). Letting y be the binary outcome of interest, the
linear probability model can be written:
Pr(y = 1|•) = β0 + β1 treatment + β2 post + β3 treatment×post + Xβ

(A.1)

where X denotes a vector of explanatory variables. In this setting, the DD estimator is the
OLS estimator of β3 (the coefficient on the interaction between treatment and post).
If (A.1) is estimated as a probit model, the DD estimator is no longer the
coefficient on the interaction term. To illustrate, consider the following:
Pr(y = 1|•) = Φ(β0 + β1 treatment + β2 post + β3 treatment×post + Xβ)

(A.2)

where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The marginal effect of
the interaction term (the analog to β3 in the linear probability model) is:
⎡Φ (β 0 + β 1treatment + β 2 post + β 3 + Χβ ) − ⎤
Δ Pr ( y = 1 | • )
=⎢
⎥
Δtreatment × post ⎣Φ (β 0 + β 1treatment + β 2 post + Χβ )
⎦

(A.3)

But the DD estimator is the marginal effect of changes in both treatment and post:
Δ [Φ (β 0 + β 1 + β 2 post + β 3 post + Χ β ) − Φ (β 0 + β 2 post + Χ β
Δ Pr ( y = 1 | • )
=
Δ treatment Δ post
Δ post

⎧[Φ (β 0 + β 1 + β 2 + β 3 + Χβ ) − Φ (β 0 + β 1 + Χβ )]⎫
=⎨
⎬
⎩− [Φ (β 0 + β 2 + Χβ ) − Φ (β 0 + Χβ )]
⎭

)]

(A.4)

As discussed by Ai and Norton (2003), Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004), and DeLeire
(2004), many authors incorrectly interpret equation (A.3) as a DD estimator, but equation
(A.4) makes clear that, in the probit model, the marginal effect of a change in the
interaction term is not the difference in differences.
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Following DeLeire (2004), we obtain DD estimates from probit models by taking
the discrete double difference of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In
particular, we estimate the probit analog to equation (1):
Pr(coveredi =1|•) = Φ[β0 + β1treatgroupi + β2HITCt + β3treatgroupi×HITCt + Xi β]
then predict four counterfactual probabilities for each observation in the sample:
1. The predicted probability of private health insurance coverage for the treatment

(

group in the post-HITC period: Φ βˆ 0 + βˆ1 + βˆ 2 + βˆ3 + Χ i βˆ

)

2. The predicted probability of private health insurance coverage for the treatment

(

group in the pre-HITC period: Φ βˆ0 + βˆ1 + Χ i βˆ

)

3. The predicted probability of private health insurance coverage for the control

(

group in the post-HITC period: Φ βˆ 0 + βˆ 2 + Χ i βˆ

)

4. The predicted probability of private health insurance coverage for the control

(

group in the pre-HITC period: Φ βˆ0 + Χ i βˆ

)

Using these predicted probabilities, we calculate the DD for each observation as

[ (βˆ
[ (βˆ

⎧⎪ Φ
⎨
⎪⎩ Φ

0
0

)]

) (
) (
)]

+ βˆ1 + βˆ 2 + βˆ3 + Χ i βˆ − Φ βˆ 0 + βˆ1 + Χ i βˆ − ⎫⎪
⎬
⎪⎭
+ βˆ 2 + Χ i βˆ − Φ βˆ 0 + Χ i βˆ

The probit DD estimator is the average of this double difference over all observations.
Obtaining standard errors by the bootstrap method is straightforward.
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